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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
CaseNo.20050746-CA 
RANDALL KEVIN JOHNS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a plea of guilty and mentally ill together with the 
subsequent sentence of the defendant on one count of Child Kidnapping a first-
degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-301.1 (1953). The trial court sentenced 
the defendant on August 15, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO MOVE 
THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
INCOMPETENT TO ENTER HIS PLEA? 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 
466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT RULING TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INCOMPETENT 
AT THE TIME HE ENTERED HIS PLEA AND THEREFORE 
HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAD BEEN VIOLATED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for 
appeal therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a 
defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
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1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FOURTH AMENDMENT - Search and Seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
SIXTH AMENDMENT - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
1 
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I 
UTAH CONSITITUION 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole 
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any 
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery 
is allowed as defined by statute or rule, (emphasis added) < 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A.§76-5-301.1. Child Kidnapping 
(1) An actor commits child kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law, and by any means and in any manner, seizes, confines, 
detains, or transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent of the victim's 
parent or guardian, or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis. 
(2) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section. 
( 
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(3) Child kidnapping is a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life. 
Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11(e)- PLEAS-
(e)The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if 
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be 
imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
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I 
withdraw the plea; and(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal 
is limited. These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents 
of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will 
be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into 
or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(Rule 11 is attached hereto, in its entirety, as Addendum B) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged with Child Kidnapping, a first-degree felony that 
carried a minimum mandatory sentence of 6, 10, or 15 to life. The trial court as 
well as counsel for both sides had serious concerns about the mental functioning 
and abilities of the defendant, and consequently several alienist were appointed to 
examine the defendant. The court finally determined that the defendant had 
received sufficient counseling to be competent to be sentenced and the Court 
sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate sentence of 5 years to life at the Utah 
State Prison, (R.83) The judgment and order on sentencing was entered on August 
15, 2005 (R. 83). On August 26, 2005, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. 
(R.97). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with Child Kidnapping, a first-degree felony 
that carried a minimum mandatory sentence of 6,10, or 15 to life. Due to some 
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questions as to the Defendant's competency, two alienists were appointed to 
evaluate the Defendant, and at a further hearing on July 22, 2004, the trial court 
reported that the two evaluations indicated that the Defendant was competent to 
stand trial. (R. 113/2) 
At a hearing on December 2, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
Defendant pled guilty and mentally ill to the charge with an agreement that the 
State would affirmatively recommend a 6-year minimum at the time of sentencing. 
According to the State, at the time of the entry of plea, the Defendant met the 
victim while fishing near his home. (R. 114 /5) The victim (a male under the age of 
14) asked the Defendant if he could use his cell phone. The Defendant told the 
child that he didn't have a phone with him, but he would allow him to use the 
phone at his house. The two then went to the house where the Defendant then 
pulled out a knife and refused to let the victim leave. At one point the Defendant 
stuck the knife in a doorjamb to emphasis the seriousness of the threat. (R. 114/5) 
After a relatively short period of time the Defendant went to a different room in the 
house and the victim left. The victim was never injured in the encounter. (R. 
114/5) The court appointed an additional alienist to reexamine the Defendant for 
sentencing purposes. 
On January 13, 2005, the court reviewed the new report prior to imposing 
sentence. The evaluation, conducted by psychologist Beverly O'Connor suggested 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
that not only was the Defendant mentally ill at the time of the offense, but she 
questioned whether or not he was competent at the time of the entry of plea to 
understand and properly enter the plea. The court, based on that report, sent the 
Defendant to the State Hospital for a 90-day period for an additional evaluation 
regarding his mental competency. (R. 115/2-6) 
i 
At a further hearing held on March 21, 2005, the court reviewed the reports 
of Dr. O'Connor as well as Dr. Rick Hawkes and made a finding as follows: 
At this point I'm going to make a finding that he does suffer from 
a significant mental defect. The he suffers from impairment in his 
capacity to reason and consider the consequences and make 
judgments. And I think that it's a reasonable extension of that that 
he does not also have the ability to consult effectively with his < 
counsel. (R. 116/5) 
The court then continued the case for the prosecutor to determine how he would 
proceed in light of this new information. 
On April 7, 2005, the matter was again brought before the court and the 
parties and the court was again in a dilemma as to how to proceed. Dr. O'Connor 
opined that the Defendant was mentally ill and not competent to proceed.(R. 
117/7) The concern was since the Defendant was not competent to proceed, the 
court could not impose sentence. Further complicating the matter was that the 
Defendant would not even be competent to authorize the filing of a motion to 
withdraw his plea. (R. 117/6) The court continued the matter for an additional 90 
days for treatment at the State Hospital. 
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On July 11, 2005, the Defendant was brought back before the court after 
receiving treatment at the State Hospital. The report from the hospital apparently 
was that the Defendant had received treatment and was competent to proceed with 
sentencing. The matter was continued one more time for the preparation of a pre-
sentence report.(R. 118/2,3) 
The Defendant was sentence on August 15, 2005, to a term at the Utah State 
Prison of 5 years to life in prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendant believes that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
when trial counsel failed to move the court to disallow his plea on the grounds that 
it was taken involuntarily. After the court and counsel received Dr. Beverly 
O'Connor's psychological evaluation, it was obvious that the defendant was unable 
to voluntarily enter a plea due to the psychological problems that he was 
experiencing at the time that the plea was entered. Furthermore the defendant was 
mentally retarded to the extent that Dr. O'Connor believed that he was unable to 
understand and comprehend the import and consequences of the plea and therefore 
could not voluntarily enter a plea. Trial counsel failed to make any motion to 
correct the obvious problem. 
The defendant further believes that the court plainly erred in not disallowing 
the defendant's plea once it had received information that the defendant was 
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incompetent to proceed at the time the plea was entered. The doctrine of manifest 
injustice should have been applied to the circumstances of the case at bar due to the 
fact that the defendant was mentally and emotionally unable to competently enter a 
plea. The trial court should have, on a sua sponte motion, thereafter disallowed the 
plea and set the case for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE < 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO MOVE THE COURT TO 
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO 
ENTER HIS PLEA. 
< 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was 
ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
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In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some 
guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the 
Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor 
form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did 
mention certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "the overarching duty 
to advocate the defendant's cause" as well as "a duty to bring to bear such skill and 
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." (Id. at 
688) Additionally, the overarching requirement by the Supreme Court in 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases includes a "performance inquiry [as to] 
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." 
(Id. at 688) 
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsels 
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was 
presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper 
discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. In that 
affirmation the Court stated: 
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Where defense counselfs failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the 
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order 
to demonstrate actual prejudice. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All 
U.S. 365, 375 (1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally 
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent 
and pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make 
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under these circumstances,
 ( 
although the failure of the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
to examine counsel's overall performance was inadvisable, we think 
this omission did not affect the soundness of the conclusion both 
courts reached — that counsel's performance fell below the level of 
reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged. 
(Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 (1986)) 
In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 
471, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court found that counsel's failure to investigate 
the extensive abuse the defendant had suffered through his life was unreasonable. 
The Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in 
defense counsels inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a 
capital case. The Court stated: ^ 
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this 
considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability 
4 
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that it would have returned with a different sentence. (Wiggins v. 
Smith at Point III) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have 
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can 
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) the 
Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th Amendment violation 
constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that case, the 
Court applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel had in a 
pretrial motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The 
trial court denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During 
trial, the officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial 
counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a 
defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for 
counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, 
quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
In the present case defense counsel failed to recognize and move the court to 
disallow the defendant's plea which was taken when he was clearly incompetent to 
enter such a plea. The trial court had previously ordered various psychological tests 
on the defendant which came back indicating that the defendant had a diminished 
capacity both at the time that the offense was committed as well as at the time of 
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the entry of plea. The report by Dr. O'Connor clearly indicated that the defendant 
had a full scale IQ of 69, which put the defendant in the "extremely low range" on 
the IQ scale. (R. 120/O'Connor report 4/5/05 page 6) 
In a competency report dated January 11, 2005, Dr. O'Connor opined that 
the defendant was not competent to assist counsel or appreciate the nature and 
i 
importance of the proceeding against him. (R.120/page 7) She further opined that 
at the time of the offense "Mr. Johns likely suffered from intellectual functioning 
that was in the Mildly Retarded Range." And "his underlying low IQ and 
neuropsychological impairments likely played a bigger role in his behavior [on the 
day of the offense] and [this] may have prevented him from forming the required 
mental state." (R. 120/ page 8,9) 
Defense counsel overlooked all these reports and apparently relied only on 
the Utah State Hospital Forensic Unit report that stated that after treatment at the 
facility he had become able to proceed on the charges. That report also stated 
4 
"Previous evaluations have provided the court with information concerning his 
likely mental state at the time of the incident events, and this matter is beyond the 
scope of this assessment." (R. 120/ pg. 4,5) 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 4 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
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of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687,80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the 
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective 
the appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into 
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or 
have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." 
Id 
In the case at bar, the second prong of the Strickland test has clearly been 
met. It is undisputed that the defendant has significant mental health and mental 
functioning limitations. Those limitations clearly combined, in the opinion of Dr. 
O'Connor to render the defendant unable to form the requisite mental intent at the 
time of the offense. Absent defense counsel's failure to raise this issue at the time 
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of sentencing constituted failure clearly within the insufficiency level contemplated 
in Strickland and its progeny. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT RULING TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INCOMPETENT 
AT THE TIME HE ENTERED HIS PLEA AND THEREFORE 
HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAD BEEN VIOLATED. 
The Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to properly preserve the 
issue for appeal. This requirement would generally mandate that defense counsel 
raise and argue the issue before the trial court. In the case of State v. Holgate, 10 
P.3d 346, 350 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the Court reaffirmed the requirement that 
"claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." In that case 
the court held: 
The preservation rule serves two important policies. First, "in the 
interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." { 
(citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989). 
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in 
challenging a conviction where there is a failure of trial counsel to make a proper 
objection. However, in the case of State v. Pierce 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) 
4 
the Supreme Court of Utah recognized a limited exception for review where 
manifest injustice allows review "in rare cases under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
4 
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Evidence, or under such exceptions as this Court considers of momentous concern 
in protecting constitutional rights previously waived." 
This doctrine of manifest injustice was further explained in the case of State 
v. Nelson-Waggoner, 94 P.3d 186 (Utah 2004) where the Court held: 
Recently, we have applied the exception sparingly, reserving it for 
the most unusual circumstances where our failure to consider an 
issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have 
resulted in manifest injustice. (Id. at 191) 
Further, in the case of State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, (Utah Ct. App. 1996) the Court 
stated: 
The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a "safety device," 
to assure that "manifest injustice does not result from the failure to 
consider an issue on appeal." Unlike "plain error," "exceptional 
circumstances" is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be 
analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used 
to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even though an 
issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine 
does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit 
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. (Id. at page 8 
citations omitted) 
Finally, in the unpublished opinion1 oi State v. Robison 2005 WL 91251 
(Utah App.) (not reported Certiorari granted), this Court made an excellent analysis 
of the manifest injustice doctrine in reversing a conviction of a defendant. In that 
case this Court held: 
1
 While defense counsel recognizes the Appellate Court's general reluctance to review unpublished decisions cited 
in a brief, analysis of the manifest injustice doctrine in the cited case could not be as clearly and concisely presented 
by defense counsel. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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]f 1 We do not necessarily disagree with the dissent's conclusion that 
Robison did not adequately present this issue either to the trial court 
or to this court. However, to avoid a "great and manifest injustice/' 
we will reach this issue sua sponte as an exception to the 
preservation rule. State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982) 
(per curiam) (stating that appellate court can reach an issue sua 
sponte as an exception to the preservation rule if a "great and 
manifest injustice" would otherwise occur); see also State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 923 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
Pierce and noting parenthetically that "court can entertain an 
exception sua sponte if facts reveal 'great and manifest injustice' 
would otherwise occur" (quoting Pierce, 655 P.2d at 677)). 
The manifest injustice in the case at bar is the Due Process violation of 
taking a plea from a defendant that the trial court knew lacked the capacity and 
competency to understand the consequences of that plea. Furthermore, the trial 
court was cognizant or should have been cognizant of the fact that the defendant 
was probably unable to form the requisite criminal intent at the time the crime 
occurred. This Court in the case of State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 675 (Utah App. 
1993) held that: 
Courts considering alleged violations in the taking of guilty pleas 
are "not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the 
petitioner received from his or her attorneys before entering the 
plea." (Quoting Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988(Utah 
1993)) 
Rule 11(e)(3) requires that a pleading defendant "knows of the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
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cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived;" (emphasis added) 
Rule 11(e)(4)(A) requires that the defendant "understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;"(emphasis added) 
Finally, Rule 11(e)(5) requires that the pleading defendant "knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences;" (emphasis added). 
In the case of Jacobs v. State, 20 P.3d 382, 385 (Utah 2001) the court, in 
denying a ten year post conviction habeas corpus petition noted that: 
"A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and 
proceedings against such a defendant do not comport with due 
process." State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989) (citing 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (I960))." In the case of York 
v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) the Utah Court 
of Appeals held: "Due process requires that a defendant be 
competent to plead guilty, (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 
172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975)) 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an individual must be 
competent to enter a guilty plea. In the case of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
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(Utah 1987) the Court placed the burden of ensuring a pleading defendants' 
competency on the trial court, and thait inquiry into such should be made at the 
time a plea in entered. In State v. Gibbons the court stated: 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring 
that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with 
when a guilty plea is entered. (Id. at 1312) 
This concept is not only mandated by due process requirements, but is 
statutory as well UCA §77-15-1 provides that, "[n]o person who is incompetent to 
proceed shall be tried for a public offense." In the case at bar, the defendant, 
according to the experts that had been employed by the court to analyze the 
defendant was mentally retarded as well as under a significant mental disorder at 
the time of the occurrence as well as at the time of the entry of plea. The due 
process implications of this complex situation should have been clearly evident to 
the trial court. The court should have sua sponte refused to sentence the defendant 
until those issue had been resolved one way or another. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse 
his conviction and remand to the trial court for further proceeding. 
DATED this _p day of IfebruaW, 2006. 
)ALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
RANDALL KEVIN JOHNS, 
Defendant 
Afh 
J 2?i 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041903027 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL D. LYON 
Date: August 15, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shannone 
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE 
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MIKE BOUWHUIS, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 1, 1963 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. CHILD KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/15/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody and represented by Mike Bouwhuis. 
Defense counsel addresses the Court and requests credit for the 
time that the defendant has served and formal probation. 
The State requests that a prison commitment be imposed based on 
the type of crime. 
Based on the four mental evaluations submitted to the court, the 
Court is satisfied that the defendant is competent to proceed. 
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Case No: 041903027 
Date: Aug 15, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD KIDNAPPING a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Dated t h i s 16 day of 20 Q£ 
MMJ2 MICHAEL D. LYON 
District Court 
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UT R RCRP Rule 11 Page 1 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 
c 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
-•RULE 11. PLEAS 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented 
by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall 
not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead 
or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set 
for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, 
or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e) (1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e) (3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e) (4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(e) (4) (B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if 
it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
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UT R RCRP Rule 11 Page 2 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e) (5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, 
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(e) (6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e) (7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a 
motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed 
to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or 
the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the 
court. 
(g) (2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h) (2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request 
of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the 
reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then 
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed 
disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may 
enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, 
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the 
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails 
on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the 
other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a 
whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule 
is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 
2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005; November 1, 2005.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
These amendments are intended to reflect current law without any substantive 
changes. The addition of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis in 
section (e) (4) (B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and is in accordance with prior case 
law. E.g. State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The rule now 
explicitly recognizes pleas under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and sets forth the factual basis required for those 
pleas. E.g. Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992). 
The amendments explicitly recognize that plea affidavits, where used, may properly 
be incorporated into the record when the trial court determines that the defendant 
has read (or been read) the affidavit, understands its contents, and acknowledges 
the contents. State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper incorporation of 
plea affidavits can save the court time, eliminate some of the monotony of rote 
recitations of rights waived by pleading guilty, and allow a more focused and 
probing inquiry into the facts of the offense, the relationship of the law to 
those facts, and whether the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. These 
benefits are contingent on a careful and considered review of the affidavit by the 
defendant and proper care by the trial court to verify that such a review has 
actually occurred. 
The final paragraph of section (e) clarifies that the trial court may, but need 
not, advise defendants concerning collateral consequences of a guilty plea. The 
failure to so advise does not affect the validity of a plea. State v. McFadden, 
884 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). 
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